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NEGOTIATING SUPERFUND 
SETTLEMENT AGREEMENTS 
Lauren Stiller Rikleen· 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and 
Liability Act of 1980 (CERCLA),1 more popularly known as "Super-
fund,"2 represents a new approach in environmental law. Unlike 
most other major pieces of environmental legislation passed in the 
last decade, CERCLA does not provide a statutory framework for 
the establishment of standards or permits to regulate industry. 
Rather, CERCLA provides the United States Environmental Pro-
tection Agency (EPA) with broad authority for achieving cleanup at 
hazardous waste sites and imposing liability for the costs -of such 
cleanup on the responsible parties. Thus, through its liability provi-
sions, the statute provides an incentive for greater diligence and con-
• Attorney, Office of Regional Counsel, Region I, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, 
Boston, Massachusetts. 
Note: This article was written by Lauren Stiller Rikleen in her private capacity. No official 
support or endorsement by the Environmental Protection Agency is intended or should be in· 
ferred. This article first appeared in the proceedings for the National Conference on the Man· 
agement of Uncontrolled Hazardous Waste Sites which took place in Washington, D.C., 
November 29 • December 1, 1982. Ms. Rikleen was a speaker at this conference; the paper was 
revised for publication in this law review. 
1. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601·9657 (1980). 
2. The "Superfund" provision is formally entitled the Hazardous Substances Response 
Fund, 42 U.S.C. S 9631 (1980). The Act establishes a $1.6 billion Hazardous Substance 
Response Trust Fund for federally·financed responses at designated stites.ld. The Superfund 
is financed jointly by industry and the federal government. Over the next five years it is ex· 
pected that industry will pay $1.38 billion to support the fund. Industry funds are raised via a 
tax on crude oil, petroleum, and approximately 42 specifically named chemical products. Pub. 
L. No. 96-50, S 2(a) (1980). 
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cern in the handling and disposal of hazardous substances as well as 
incentives for responsible parties to resolve their potential liabilities 
for environmental contamination through the negotiation of settle-
ment agreements. 
The first legislative response to the growing problem of hazardous 
waste disposal sites resulted in the passage of the Resource Conser-
vation and Recovery Act (RCRA) in 1976.3 Under RCRA the EPA 
was granted authority to control hazardous waste disposal by estab-
lishing a comprehensive regulatory scheme and by bringing suits to 
abate imminent hazards.4 To strengthen the efforts to clean up the 
nation's thousands of known hazardous waste disposal sites, Con-
gress passed CERCLA in 1980 as a supplement to RCRA. Like 
RCRA, CERCLA authorizes EPA to bring suit and to issue admini-
strative orders to abate hazards.6 The unique focus of CERCLA is in 
its authorization of government actions to contain, clean up, and 
remove hazardous wastes.6 The Superfund provisions allow for the 
recovery of response costs7 incurred in site cleanup and for damages 
to natural resources. 8 
Potentially, CERCLA provides a strong arsenal of legal theories 
for EPA to use in its pursuit against parties responsible for environ-
mental contamination. At Superfund sites throughout the country, 
the EPA is pursuing its enforcement options, and in many of these 
cases settlement negotiations are already underway. 9 These negotia-
tions must, of necessity, take place without the benefit of Superfund 
case law as there has not yet been a full trial of a Superfund case. 
This lack of precedent makes the negotiation of Superfund settle-
ment agreements particularly difficult.10 
3. 42 U.S.C. SS 6901-6987 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980). 
4. Section 7003 of RCRA, 42 U.S.C. S 6973(a), authorizes EPA to bring suit in federal dis-
trict court to obtain an injunctive relief to prevent imminent and substantial danger to health 
or the environment from the handling or disposal of waste. EPA may also issue administrative 
orders "as may be necessary to protect public health and the environment." Id. 
5. 42 U.S.C. S 9606 (1980). 
6. Id. S 9604. 
7. Id. S 9612. 
8. Id. S 9607(a)(4). 
9. Section 105(8)(B) of CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. S 9605(8)(B), requires a national list of at least 
400 of the highest priority facilities for remedial action. On October 23, 1981, the Adminis-
trator released an interim priority list of 115 sites; the Woburn site which is the subjeet of this 
article was listed in the top ten. EPA has proposed a list of 418 priority sites at 47 Fed. Reg. 
58,476 (Dec. 30, 1982), and has pursued agreements to secure cleanup of sites. See, e.g., Chem-
Dyne Settlement, 12 ENVT'L L. REP. 30,026 (S.D. Ohio Civ. No. C1-82-840, filed Aug. 26, 
1982). 
10. See Comment, EPA Proposes Court-Ordered Contingency Plan Revisions Under 
"Superfund"; Stresses "Flexible" Cleanup Standards, 12 ENVT'L L. REP. 10040 (1982). 
1982-83] SUPERFUND SETTLEMENT AGREEMENTS 699 
The following article outlines the general liability scheme of 
CERCLA and discusses major issues likely to arise in the course of 
settlement negotiations. In addition, this article will also examine 
how these issues were confronted and resolved in the determination 
of one party's liability for a hazardous waste site in Woburn, Massa-
chusetts. 
II. LIABILITY PROVISIONS OF CERCLA 
Sections 104,11106,12 and 10713 of CERCLA provide the underpin-
nings for EPA's Superfund enforcement scheme. The specific lan-
guage of authorization in these sections is directed to the President. 
With certain limited exceptions, the functions vested by CERCLA in 
the President were delegated to the Administrator of EPA by Ex-
ecutive Order 12,316 of August 14, 1981,14 On December 28, 1981, 
the Administrator redelegated certain remedial and response 
authorities pursuant to section 104 subsections (a), (b), and (c) to the 
Assistant Administrator for Solid Waste and Emergency Response. 
Section 104(a)(1) provides that the government is authorized to 
act,15 consistent with the National Contingency Plan,16 whenever: 
(A) any hazardous substance17 is released or there is a substantial 
11. 43 U.S.C. S 9604. 
12. [d. S 9606. 
13. [d. § 9607. 
14. Responses to Environmental Damage, Exec. Order No. 12,316, 46 Fed. Reg. 42,237 
(August 20, 1981). 
15. Such acts include authorization 
to remove or arrange for the removal of, and provide for remedial action relating to 
such hazardous substance, pollutant or contaminant at any time . . . or take any 
other response measure consistent with the national contingency plan which the 
President deems necessary to protect the public health or welfare or the environ-
ment. ... 
42 U.S.C. § 9604(a)(1). 
16. The National Contingency Plan (NCP) was originally established pursuant to the 
Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, currently the Clean Water Act, 33 
U.S.C. § 1321 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980), to coordinate federal action with respect to oil and 
hazardous substance discharges. Section 105 of CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. § 9605, ties the methods 
of government response, the recovery of response monies drawn from the Superfund, and the 
liabilities of responsible parties to the procedural and substantive requirements of the National 
Contingency Plan. The original NCP was prepared by the Council on Environmental Quality; 
revised updated versions are to be done by EPA. Section 105, 42 U.S.C. § 9605, requires the 
publication of a National Hazardous Substance Response Plan under the NCP to establish 
procedures and standards for responding to releases of hazardous substances, pollutants, and 
contaminants. This document was published at 47 Fed. Reg. 31,180 (July 16, 1982), codified at 
40 C.F.R. §§ 300.68(h), (i) & (j) (1982). 
17. Hazardous substances are defined in section 101(14) of CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. § 9601(14), 
as all substances identified as toxic hazardous pollutants under the Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. 
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threat of such a release18 into the environment, or (B) there is a re-
lease or substantial threat of release into the environment of any pol-
lutant or contaminant19 which may present an imminent and 
substantial danger to the public health or welfare. A crucial excep-
tion to this authority to act is if the "President determines that such 
removal and remedial action will be done properly by the owner or 
operator of the vessel or facility from which the release or threat of 
release emanates, or by any other responsible party."20 Hence, 
federal remedial response is predicated on the inability or unwill-
ingness of the responsible parties to properly respond to the release 
or threat of release. 
Section 106(a) of the Act provides that, upon determining that 
there may be an imminent and substantial endangerment due to an 
actual or threatened release of a hazardous substance, the govern-
ment, EPA through the Attorney General, may secure such relief as 
necessary to abate the danger or threat. The government is also 
authorized to take other action, including the issuance of admini-
strative orders, to compel necessary action. 21 
Section 107 sets forth four categories of parties who may be held 
responsible for any incurrence of response22 costs consistent with 
the National Contingency Plan, including all costs of removal or 
remedial action incurred by the United States government. Broadly 
speaking, these categories consist of: (1) owners and operators of a 
facility (or other source of release); (2) owners or operators of the 
facility at the time of disposal; (3) any person who arranged for the 
S 1321 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980), 40 C.F.R. S 116.4 (1981); pollutants under the Clean Air Act, 
42 U.S.C. S 7412 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980), 40 C.F.R. S 60 (1981); and hazardous wastes under 
RCRA, 42 U.S.C. S 6921 (1976), 40 C.F.R. S 261.3 (1981); imminently hazardous substances 
under the Toxic Substances Control Act, 15 U.S.C. S 2606 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980), 40 C.F.R. S 
261.3 (1981). 
18. The term "release" is defined as including any "spilling, leaking, pumping, pouring, 
emitting, emptying, discharging, injecting, escaping, leaching, dumping or disposing into the 
environment." 42 U.S.C. S 9601(22). 
19. "Pollutant or contaminant" is defined in section 104(a)(2) of CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. S 
9604(a)(2). 
20. 42 U.S.C. S 9604(a)(l). 
21. [d. S 9606(a). 
22. Response is defined in section 101(25) of CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. S 9601(25). There are two 
general types of response action: removal and remedial actions. Removal actions largely in-
volve cleanup activity Qr monitoring to prevent or minimize damages from the release of haz-
ardous substances. Removal actions can also include short-term measures to provide alterna-
tive water supplies and otherwise protect the public and the environment. 40 C.F.R. S 300.66 
(1982). Remedial actions are authorized only at sites listed on the National Priority List, 8'Upra 
note 16, and are intended to provide a permanent remedy instead of "or in addition to removal 
actions." 42 U.S.C. S 9601(24). 
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disposal or treatment of hazardous substances or arranged with a 
transporter for transport for disposal or treatment of hazardous 
substances; and (4) transporters of hazardous substances to the site 
at which the release or threat of release occurred. 23 
Subject only to certain dollar limits24 and limited defenses,26 sec-
tion 107 generally imposes strict liability26 for government response 
costs and damages to natural resources. A responsible party is liable 
for specified costs and damages resulting from a release or threat of 
release of hazardous substances where there has been a response ac-
tion pursuant to Superfund. These costs include reasonable expendi-
tures necessary to assess the extent of the hazard or damages. Sums 
recovered under Superfund for damages to natural resources can be 
used to restore and rehabilitate the injured resources or to acquire 
equivalent natural resources. This does not indicate, however, that 
the measure of damages is to be limited by the amount required to 
rehabilitate or replace injured natural resources.27 
23. ld. S 9607(a). Many generators (firms which create the wastes) argue that they have lit-
tle or no involvement with the actual disposal activities. Generators usually have had a simple 
contractual arrangement with a hauler, who usually sought to avoid high transportation and 
disposal costs, and had neither the expertise nor the incentive to dispose of wastes carefully. 
See Rogers, The Generators' Dilemma in Superfund Cases, 12 ENVT'L L. REP. 15,049 (1982). 
Although S 107 does not expressly impose liability on a person merely for "generating" waste, 
it clearly imposes liability on a generator who has selected a treatment or disposal facility "by 
contract, agreement, or otherwise." 42 U.S.C. S 9607(a). Section 107 also includes generators 
who arranged for waste to be transported for disposal by another, and thus would appear to in-
clude virtually any generator.ld. 
In addition, section 112, 42 U.S.C. S 9612, subrogates to the federal government all claims 
for response costs which have been compensated for by the Superfund Trust Fund. As a result, 
a responsible party who does not fall within one of the four categories of S 107(a) could never-
theless be held liable for response costs. Section 112(c)(3) specifically provides that an action to 
recover money expended may be brought on behalf of the Fund against "any owner, operator, 
or guarantor, or . . . other person . . . liable . . . for the damages or costs" of the compen-
sated cleanup. ld. S 9612(c)(3). 
24. For example, for most facilities liability may not exceed the total of all response costs 
plus $50 million or some lesser amount set by regulation. 42 U.S.C. S 9607(c)(I)(D). The regula-
tions, however, cannot set a limit below $5 million.ld. In addition, S 105,42 U.S.C. S 9605, and 
the National Contingency Plan require that remedial cleanup actions be cost-effective. 
25. See 42 U.S.C. S 9607(a)(4)(C) (listing defenses as: 1) an act of God; 2) an act of war; 3) an 
act of omission by a wholly unrelated third party; 4) any combination of the foregoing). 
26. The Act does not explicitly establish a strict liability standard. Instead, S 101(32), 42 
U.S.C. S 9601(32), defines "liability" as that standard which applies under S 311 of the Clean 
Water Act, 33 U.S.C. S 1321 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980). Recent cases have interpreted this provi-
sion of the CW A as creating strict liability. See, e.g., United States v. LeBoeuf Bros. Towing 
Co., 621 F.2d 787, 789 (5th Cir. 1980); Steuart Transp. Co. v. Allied Towing, 596 F.2d 609,613 
(4th Cir. 1979). See infra text and note at note 47. 
27. 42 U.S.C. S 9607(f). The term "natural resources" includes "land, fish, wildlife, biota, 
air, water, ground water, drinking water supplies, and other such resources belonging to, 
managed by, held in trust by, appertaining to, or otherwise controlled by" federal, state, or 
local government, or any foreign government. ld. S 9601(16). 
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In addition, Superfund provides for punitive damages in certain 
circumstances. Section 107(c)(3) of CERCLA allows the United 
States to seek up to three times the costs incurred by the Superfund 
if a liable party fails, without sufficient cause, to properly provide 
removal or remedial action upon an order issued pursuant to sections 
104 or 106 of the Act.28 
A. Initiating the Superfund Enforcement Process 
Consistent with the intent of section 104 of the Act, EPA has a pol-
icy29 of attempting to secure cleanup by the responsible parties 
rather than using the Superfund trust fund established under 
CERCLA 80 whenever such cleanup can be accomplished properly 
and in a timely manner. Potentially responsible parties generally 
have advance notice of any proposed governmental response action 
at a particular site. Superfund requires that EPA prepare and up-
28. Id. S 9607(c)(3). 
29. Memorandum from Christopher J. Capper, Acting Ass't Administrator for Office of 
Solid Waste and Emergency Response, and William A. Sullivan, Jr., Enforcement Counsel, to 
the Regional Administrators, Hazardous Waste Compliance and Enforcement Program 
Guidance, at 5 (Feb. 23, 1982). 
Section 104(a) of the Act provides that EPA may take appropriate response action unless it 
determines that "such removal and remedial action will be done properly by the owner or 
operator" of the facility, or by any other responsible party. 42 U.S.C. S 9604(a)(1). EPA may 
pursue a variety of options to achieve cleanup of a site, including private settlements, 
unilateral enforcement orders, and civil actions. For example, EPA need not spend federal 
funds if a responsible party undertakes the cleanup under an enforceable agreement, or if a 
party is required to do so by a court order or an administrative order. 
30. 42 U.S.C. S 9631 (1980). See supra note 2. 
The current National Contingency Plan (NCP) emphasizes a concern for preserving money 
in the Fund. It also contains a complex process for evaluating the cost and effectiveness of 
alternative remedial programs. 40 C.F.R. SS 300.68(b), (h), (i), & (j), added by 47 Fed. Reg. 
31,180 (July 16, 1982). As a result, EPA policy stresses private cleanup actions in order to con-
serve Fund monies. Subpart F of the NCP appears to authorize cleanup actions financed by 
the Fund only after a determination that the responsible parties will not adequately clean up 
the release or abate the hazard. Id. S 300.61(b). 
This fund-balancing approach has been criticized on two fronts: 1) the lack of specific stand-
ards set by EPA makes it difficult to determine what constitutes adequate or proper cleanup; 
2) coupled with the first point, a single-minded concern for preserving funds limits overall gov-
ernmental cleanup efforts. See HAzARDOUS WASTE REp., vol. 3, no. 17, at 4 (March 22,1982); 
ENVT'L REP. (BNA) 1475 (March, 1982). Nonetheless, EPA applies appropriate criteria to 
determine the cleanup level required for specific releases as they occur at a site as well as con-
sidering other relevant technological and environmental factors. The need to preserve a cer-
tain level of Fund money is made necessary by those instances where Fund money is spent and 
no solvent responsible party can be found to recompense the Fund. Further, the safeguarding 
of the Fund and the encouragement of private cleanup settlements is consistent with S 104 of 
CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. S 6904. See 47 Fed. Reg. 10,978 (March 12, 1982); 47 Fed. Reg. 31,180 
(July 16, 1982). 
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date annually a list of priority facilities31 and, consistent with cost-
effectiveness requirements of the Act and the National Contingency 
Plan, the proposal of response action is usually preceded by a period 
of investigation and study at the site. 32 Therefore, prior to the 
expenditure of government funds at a Superfund site, notice will 
generally be sent to responsible parties. 33 
It should be noted, however, that EPA takes the position that a 
notice letter is not a legal precondition for a subsequent lawsuit by 
EPA to seek cost recovery against a responsible party if Fund 
money is spent.34 There may be a number of reasons why a notice let-
ter does not issue prior to the expenditure of Superfund fund money. 
For example, EPA may be involved in on-going negotiations with a 
responsible party, making such notice unnecessary, or, alternatively, 
there may be no evidence linking the responsible party to the site 
known to EPA at the time Superfund fund money was spent. 
Implicit in the notice letter process is the concept that such a letter 
will set into motion an opportunity to resolve informally the prob-
lems at the site, thereby eliminating the need to initiate court action. 
Where an agreement is reached prior to litigation, the agreement 
will be reduced to writing via an enforceable agreement, preferably a 
judicial consent decree.36 Hence, in most cases where responsible 
parties are identified, formal legal action, if any, at a site will be 
preceded by a period of time in which settlement negotiations will oc-
cur. The mere existence of a responsible party, however, will not pre-
vent the agency from moving forward with the expenditure of 
Superfund money or from taking formal legal action if the responsi-
ble party is not willing to address the problems at the site in a proper 
and timely manner. 36 
B. Advantages oj Settlement 
Both the government and the responsible parties have much to 
gain if the problems at a site can be resolved through negotiations. 
31. 42 U.S.C. SS 9605, 9607(a)(4)(C). See supra note 16. 
32. 42 U.S.C. § 9605. Further, prior to taking any response action, EPA consults with the 
affected state. For response actions over six months long or costing over $1 million EPA ob-
tains state agreement to share in the costs. Id. § 9604(c). 
33. Memorandum, Hazardous Waste Compliance, supra note 29, at 5; Guidelines for Using 
the Imminent Hazard, Enforcement, and Emergency Response Authorities of Superfund and 
Other Statutes, 47 Fed. Reg. 20,664 (May, 1982). 
34. Memorandum from Sullivan & Capper to Regional Administrators, et al., Coordination 
of Superfund Enforcement and Fund-Financed Clean-Up Activities, at 10 (Nov. 25, 1981). 
35. See 42 U.S.C. § 9606. 
36. Memorandum, Hazardous Waste Compliance, supra note 29, at 7. 
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From the government's perspective, the statutory objective is 
achieved if a responsible party undertakes the cleanup obligations. 
Superfund money is preserved for those sites which will not be 
addressed by a responsible party. In addition, because of the intrica-
cies of federal contracting and the CERCLA statutory requirements 
relative to state participation,87 it is likely that the site will be 
cleaned up more quickly if the responsible party agrees to do so 
voluntarily. Finally, while negotiations themselves can be very re-
source-intensive for EPA, resolution of a case through settlement 
will invariably take less time and resources than if the case were ac-
tually litigated. 
There are also numerous advantages to settlement for the respon-
sible party. CERCLA provides EPA with a broad delegation of 
authority as to what are appropriate actions for which the govern-
ment can recover costS.88 In addition, the potential exists for the re-
covery of triple the actual costs expended by virtue of the punitive 
damages section.89 Further, the potential application of a strict lia-
bility standard places a significantly greater burden on the respons-
ible party in actual litigation. '0 A responsible party avoids these 
problems by settling, and gains the additional benefit of participat-
ing in the decisions and final terms spelling out the scope of its in-
volvement in the resolution of the problems at the site. 61 
Another concern to a responsible party at a Superfund site is cost; 
a party considering a settlement must balance the projected costs of 
a negotiated cleanup against the substantial legal fees necessary to 
37. For example, unless there is a continuing emergency, EPA can spend more than $1 
million only if the affected state agrees to a minimum contribution sum and makes a commit-
ment to find a place for uncovered hazardous substances. Specifically, the state must assure 
future maintenance of the site and assure the avaiIability, if necesssary, of an acceptable 
hazardous waste disposal facility. 42 U.S.C. S 9604(c). See Anderton & Barto, Stringfellow, A 
Case HiBtury ofCWtrure Fa.cilitieB, 1982 NAT'L CoNF. ON ENVT'L ENG'G at 466. 
38. EPA promulgates regulations for the assessment of damages from a release. Consistent 
with the NCP, which provides the administrative framework for carrying out response ac-
tions, these regulations identify simple assessment techniques using minimal field observation 
as well as detailed procedures for extensive field work to be used as situations require. 
39. 42 U.S.C. S 9607(c)(3). See B'Upra text and note at note 28. 
40. At the very least, CERCLA provides that natural resource damage assessments made 
pursuant to Superfund cleanup regulations shall have the force and effect of a rebuttable 
presumption in a judicial or administrative proceeding against a responsible party to recovery 
sums spent by the Fund. 42 U.S.C. S 9611(h)(2). See Menefee, Rf1CO'IJ6f"!I ftyr Natural Resource 
Damage Under Superju:nd: The Role oftM ReINttoble Preav.mption. 12 ENVT'L L. REp. 15,057 
(1982). See fI6'I6'I'Gll1l, SUPERFUND: A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, VOL. 1 (H. Cohn Needham & M. 
Menefee, eds. 1982). 
41. See Pain, M.,.Pa:rlJ Superju:ttd Negotia.titmB, 12 ENVT'L L. REp. 15,054 (1982). 
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fight and possibly lose a law suit. Even if a responsible party thinks 
his legal defenses will prevail in a court of law, it is necessary to take 
into account the enormous costs of litigating hazardous wastes cases 
due to the substantial time needed to prepare legal arguments and 
expert witnesses. The limited number of hazardous waste cases that 
have actually been litigated to date indicate that such trials can take 
months.42 
Finally, a responsible party may find there are public relations ad-
vantages to settling. Rather than being portrayed as the irrespons-
ible cause of a pollution problem who refused to help clean it up, a 
corporation has the opportunity to be the "good corporate citizen" 
that volunteered to rectify an environmental problem. 
III. MAJOR ISSUES IN SETI'LEMENT NEGOTIATIONS 
A. The Woburn Hazardous Waste Site 
The Woburn hazardous waste site is known locally as either Indus-
tri-Plex 128 or the Mark-Phillips Trust property. The site is located 
in the northeast corner of Woburn, Massachusetts, a city 
approximately 12 miles north of Boston. Use of this area for heavy 
industrial purposes began in 1853, when a small company called the 
Woburn Chemical Works began manufacturing a variety of common 
chemical solutions such as vitiol, sodas, and gums. Following the in-
solvency of the Woburn Chemical Works, the area was the home for 
the Merrimac Chemical Company- (Merrimac). Merrimac began by 
producing basic chemicals for the region's numerous leather, textile, 
and paper industries. By the early 1900's, Merrimac was one of the 
largest chemical manufacturers in New England. During World War 
I, the New England Manufacturing Company was established and 
operated by Merrimac for the production of war materials, including 
the manufacture of trinitrotoluene (TNT) and other chemical inter-
mediates used in the production of explosives. In 1929, Monsanto 
Chemical Company acquired Merrimac, and approximately two 
years later, Monsanto transferred the Merrimac operations out of 
Woburn. 
The area came back into industrial use in 1934 when New England 
Chemical Industries, a subsidiary of Consolidated Chemical Com-
42. E.g., Village of Wilsonville v. SCA Services, Inc., No. 52885 (Ill. Sup. Ct., May 22, 1981), 
reprinted in 2 CHEM. & RADIATION WASTE LIT. REp. 288 (1981) (length of trial over 100 days); 
State Dep't Envt'} Protection v. Ventron Corp., Nos. A-1395-79, A-1432-79, A-1446-79, 
A-1545-79 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div., Dec. 9, 1981) (length of trial 55 days). 
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pany (Consolidated), began a glue manufacturing operation. In the 
1950's, Consolidated was acquired by Stauffer Chemical Company 
(Stauffer). Stauffer continued glue manufacturing activities at the 
site until the late 1960's, when the property was purchased by the 
Mark-Phillips Trust (the Trust). The Trust began immediately to 
transform the former chemical manufacturing site into an industrial 
office park and shopping center. In the course of developing this 
property, excavation activities uncovered buried wastes. Odor emis-
sions from ta'lese uncovered wastes were the first indication of the 
environmental problems at the site. Upon greater investigation, it 
became clear that the scope of the environmental contamination in-
cluded the pollution of wetlands and the discovery of a number of 
hazardous chemical wastes.'S 
B. The Settlement 
On May 25, 1982, EPA, pursuant to the statutory authority of sec-
tion 106 of CERCLA, issued an order on consent to the Stauffer 
Chemical Company for the investigative study, cleanup, and future 
monitoring of the Woburn site described above. This site was listed 
by the Administrator of EPA as one of the top ten most hazardous 
Superfund sites in the country." The Commonwealth of Massachu-
setts, through its Department of Environmental Quality Engineer-
ing (DEQE), participated in the settlement negotiations and was a 
party to the agreement. The settlement marked the first use of 
CERCLA's section 106 administrative order authority at a site listed 
as a priority site. 
The settlement negotiations presented the regulatory agencies 
with a number of difficult problems that had to be resolved before 
the parties could enter into a consent order. Many of the issues con-
fronted are likely to arise in the context of settlement negotiations at 
other sites. Successful resolution of these issues requires a careful 
understanding and balance of various EPA policies relevant to the 
implementation of CERCLA, the technical needs of the site, the 
, motivations and interests of the negotiating responsible party, and 
the concerns of the affected community. These issues include the ap-
43. It should be noted that there is another Woburn site which has been listed on the priority 
list; specifically, this site is listed as Wells G & H. Wells G & H are two drinking water wells 
which were removed from service in 1979 due to contamination. Although frequently con· 
fused, these two sites on the list represent two unrelated problems in the ~ity of Woburn. 
44. On October 23, 1981, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. S 9605(8)(B) and the NCP, EPA issued an in· 
terim priority list of 115 sites, including the Woburn site. See supra note 9. 
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portionment of liability, the content and scope of any releases, the 
handling of indefinite commitments by agreement, citizen participa-
tion, and federal-state relations. 
1. Apportionment of Liability 
Joint and several liability is a legal theory which, if applicable in a 
given fact situation, can result in anyone of a number of responsible 
parties being held responsible for all of the damages. The issue of 
joint and several liability only arises where the acts of more than one 
party produce a single harm.46 
In a hazardous waste context, a simplistic scenario for the applica-
tion of joint and several liability is the multiple generator situation. 
In such a situation a number of companies may have shipped barrels 
of a single type of hazardous waste to a: site, little or no evidence may 
exist concerning the amounts of the substance shipped by each com-
pany, and some or all of the barrels may leak, releasing hazardous 
chemicals from the site and resulting in ground water contamina-
tion. Under these circumstances, each of the generators may be held 
responsible on the theory that the harm to the ground water caused 
by one of the generators is indistinguishable from the harm caused 
by any of the others in the sequence of events; therefore one or all 
may be held fully liable. 
The concept is best summarized as follows: 
Where the tortious acts of two or more wrongdoers join to pro-
duce an indivisible injury, that is, an injury which from its nature 
cannot be apportioned with reasonable certainty to the in-
dividual wrongdoers, all of the wrongdoers will be held jointly 
and severally liable for the entire damages and the injured party 
may proceed to judgment against anyone separately or against 
all in one suit. 46 
The manner in which joint and several liability will be applied by a 
court in the Superfund context is not fully known at this time. While 
EPA and the Department of Justice will argue the applicability of 
joint and several liability where the facts warrant,47 industry strong-
ly maintains that the theory is not applicable in a CERCLA lawsuit. 
Actual resolution of the controversy will not occur until the issue has 
been fully litigated, and even then case law may vary depending on 
the particular fact situation before the court. 
45. 74 Am. Jur. 2d § 62 (1980). 
46. Landers v. East Texas Salt Water Disposal Co., 248 S.W.2d 731,734 (Tex. 1952). 
47. The Justice Department has maintained that joint and several liability is the appropriate 
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As a practical matter, most successful negotiations will result in 
some type of apportionment of liability. 48 In most cases there would 
be little economic incentive for a responsible party to be willing to 
cooperate with the federal government unless some apportionment 
of liability is recognized. EPA's willingness, therefore, to apportion 
liability in a negotiated agreement where the facts are appropriate 
should not be viewed as a rejection of the applicability of the joint 
and several liability theory to the site at hand,49 but rather as a prac-
tical recognition that the apportioning of liability is an important 
aspect of encouraging settlements. 
In the Woburn site settlement, even though there was more than 
one responsible party, Stauffer was the only responsible party 
participating in the settlement negotiations. As a result, apportion-
ment of liability was a major issue in the discussions. Stauffer and 
companies it acquired had manufactured glue at the site; Stauffer 
was willing to assume responsibility for those wastes generated by 
the glue manufacturing process. Other wastes found at the site 
resulted from the manufacturing activities of the other known 
responsible party. Further, some of the wastes from all prior opera-
standard under Superfund as well as under S 7003 of RCRA. See Superfund Liability, Memo-
randum from Khristine L. Hall, Att'y, Policy, Legislation and Special Litigation Section, U.S. 
Dep't of Justice to James W. Moorman, Ass't Att'y Gen., Land & Natural Resources Div., U.S. 
Dep't of Justice (March 13, 1980), reprinted in 1 CHEM. & RADIATION WASTE·LIT. REP. 
1298-305 (Jan. 1981). 
Superfund does not apportion liability among responsible parties for response costs and 
damages. Yet, Congress deleted a provision which would have held parties jointly and several-
ly liable. This deletion is not regarded as a rejection of joint and several liability , however. 126 
CoNG. REc. H11,788 (daily ed. Dec. 3, 1980) (letter from Ass't Att'y Gen. Parker); 126 CONGo 
REC. S14,964 (daily ed. Dec. Nov. 24, 1980) (remarks of Sen. Randolph, Floor Sponsor of the 
bill, Chmn. Sen. Comm. Envt'l & Pub. Works). There is significant legislative history support-
ing EPA's position that the joint and several liability provision was deleted from CERCLA in 
order to leave the issue to be resolved by the courts through the common law of torts. See, e.g., 
id.; 126 CONGo REc. H11,787 (daily ed. Dec. 3, 1980) (remarks of Rep. Florio, Floor Sponsor of 
the bill). See also Note, Joint and Several Liability jor Hazardous Waste Releases Under 
Superfund, 68 U. VA. L. REv. 1157 (1982). 
48. A few decided cases suggest that the courts are willing to apportion damages. See, e.g., 
United States V. Venae Chemical, 489 F. Supp. 870, 888 (E.D. Ark. 1980); United States V. 
Waste Industries, No. 80-4-CIV-7 (E.D.N.C. Apr. 7, 1981) (order denying motion to dismiss). 
Actual methodologies of apportionment may vary depending on the nature and extent of 
hazardous substance contamination involved. A predominant method is that of volumetric cal-
culation. To the extent that the volume of hazardous substances at a site can be attributed to a 
responsible party, this method provides guidance with regard to the party's ultimate maxi-
mum liability exposure. In some multi-party situations or where technological information is 
sparse, volumetric apportionment may be difficult to calculate and may not reflect actual rela-
tive toxicity of particular released substances. 
49. See 42 U.S.C. S 9607(e); BUpra note 47. 
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tions had been commingled due to the land development activities of 
one of the present property owners. 
The apportionment issue was resolved as follows: Stauffer agreed 
to undertake the full investigative study of the entire site and to par-
ticipate in the cleanup of Stauffer-generated wastes. Mter the con-
clusion of the investigative study, EPA and the DEQE will deter-
mine Stauffer's proportionate responsibility for the contamination at 
the site by using a formula set forth in the agreement. This formula 
will then be the basis for apportioning the costs incurred in im-
plementing the investigative study. Stauffer may choose whatever 
legal means it deems appropriate to recover those funds it expended 
on the study beyond its proportionate share. In addition, because the 
apportionment determination will be made prior to the implementa-
tion of the actual cleanup, Stauffer's participation in the cleanup and 
future monitoring will be limited to its determined proportionate 
responsibility . 
2. Releases 
The release provision is an issue of great concern to a party enter-
ing settlement negotiations. Most responsible parties enter negotia-
tions with the expectation that, if the case is successfully resolved 
through settlement, their potential liability at that site will be ended. 
Unfortunately, full information regarding the nature and extent of 
all parties involved with and of all damages from particular releases 
usually will not be known at the time of settlement. Problems such as 
protection from third party contribution and extended, open-ended 
liability of a settling party may not arise until after the cleanup ac-
tivities under the settlement have been completed. 50 A settlement 
agreement and its release provisions can be structured so as to 
minimize these problems. 51 
50. Responsible parties often prefer to obtain a "total buy·out" settlement, a complete 
release from all liability for any and all claims both as to existing problems and future prob-
lems. Just as often, however, the government cannot be certain what ultimate soil and ground 
water cleanup will be required. As a result, responsible parties may also prefer that settlement 
negotiations split soil, surface water, and ground water problems. Under such plans a respon-
sible party pays a sum commensurate with its volumetric share of wastes at a site in return for 
a release for surface cleanup only; the government may retain claims for soil and ground water 
pollution. See, e.g., United States v. Chem-Dyne Corp., 12 ENVT'L L. REP. 30,026 (S.D. Ohio 
Civ. No. Cl-82-840, filed Aug. 26, 1982); United States and South Carolina Dep't Health & 
Envt'l Control v. South Carolina Recycling & Disposal (D.S.C. No. 80-1274-6, filed March 23, 
1982). 
51. The agreement could incorporate all elements of relevant state statutes protecting joint 
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Although the scope of the release will vary with each fact situation, 
there are certain general principles which the negotiating parties 
should recognize at the outset. First, the releases run to the settle-
ment of civil claims only; the EPA cannot settle criminal liability . 52 
Second, the scope of the release should be commensurate with the 
scope of the cleanup; a total release should not be granted if the par-
ty is not undertaking its total share of the study and cleanup. 58 
Third, the release should be conditioned upon the timely and satisfac-
tory completion of all of the party's obligations under the 
agreement. 54 Fourth, EPA cannot bind other federal agencies. 
Therefore, EPA should not attempt to bind the "United States" or 
waive claims which may be asserted by other federal agencies. 55 
Finally, EPA should be very careful to protect its future rights 
against other responsible parties who are not participating in the set-
tlement.56 
In the Woburn site negotiations Stauffer's release provision was 
conditioned on Stauffer's fulfillment of all the commitments made in 
the Consent Order. An important issue arose, however, as to the 
scope of that release; that is, under which environmental statutes 
Stauffer's release would be effective. EPA's position was that the 
release would correspond to the jurisdictional authority of the con-
sent order. Therefore, since the consent order was issued pursuant 
to CERCLA and section 7003 of the Resource Conservation and 
Recovery Act,57 and since Stauffer agreed to assume full responsibil-
ity for its own wastes, the release stated that fulfillment of 
Stauffer's commitments in the agreement constituted full satisfac-
tortfeasors who have settled in the event that non-settling parties seek to add settling parties 
to a Superfund suit or otherwise seek contribution. 
52_ Memorandum from Sullivan to Regional Counsels, et al., Guidance on Hazardous Waste 
Site Settlement Negotiations, at 4 (Dec. 18, 1981). 
53. Id. Because of the lack of full information at the settlement stage, some negotiations 
proceed in phases, seeking relief in stages: first, immediate action to secure the site; second, 
removal of any drums and/or bulk liquids; third, study, assessment, and implementation of 
long-term remedial action to clean soil and ground water at the site. See infra discussion at 
III.B.3. 
54. Memorandum, Settlement Negotiations, supra note 52, at 4. 
55. For example, since the Department of the Interior is the trustee of natural resources, a 
settlement document signed solely by the Department of Justice on behalf of EPA for re-
sponse costs may not settle the issue of natural resource damages. In the Chern-Dyne settle-
ment the Department of the Interior did not sign on behalf of all United States agencies and 
expressly excluded natural resource damage claims from the settlement agreement. See 12 
ENVT'L L. REP. 30,026-27 (1982). 
56. Memorandum, Settlement Negotiations, supra note 52, at 4. 
57. Id; 42 U.S.C. S 6973. 
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tion of EPA's civil claims pursuant to CERCLA and RCRA. To pro-
tect the rights of the parties entering into the consent order against 
other nonsettling parties, a provision was inserted in the agreement, 
consistent with Massachusetts law, clearly stating that the release to 
Stauffer in no way affects the liability of any other responsible 
party. 58 
3. Handling Indefinite Commitments by Agreement 
A comprehensive settlement agreement requires fully addressing 
at the outset the scope of the investigative study, the cleanup and 
subsequent monitoring commitments, and the release provision. 
Nonetheless, these commitments usually must be made at a time 
whEm there is frequently little information available to quantify the 
extent of the problem being addressed or the adequacy of the intend-
ed actions. 
Because of the difficulties such a situation imposes, a responsible 
party may only be willing to negotiate its involvement in the investi-
gative study, leaving its cleanup liability for resolution at a later 
date. Even if EPA were to be responsive to a proposal for a partial 
settlement, the negotiating party would obviously not be able to 
benefit from a release provision relative to its cleanup liability, there-
by leaving unresolved a major aspect of its liability and a major moti-
vating factor for entering into negotiations at the outset. In addition, 
the resolution of the total problem would remain unresolved. It 
seems, therefore, to be in the best interests of the responsible party 
and the EPA to enter into comprehensive settlements which address 
all aspects of the site, rather than piecemeal agreements in which on-
ly portions of the problem are resolved at a time. 59 
The Woburn agreement provides an illustration of how indefinite 
commitments are made relative to future actions and expenditures 
unknown at the time of negotiations. In general, a "checks and bal-
ances" system was developed; adequate controls were built into each 
commitment made by the parties such that each party had an inter-
est in fulfilling its responsibilities. For example, with regard to the 
investigative study commitments, Stauffer agreed to a phased ap-
58. The original common law rule was that the release of one or more, but less than all, joint 
tortfeasors was a release of all of them. Both courts and legislatures have made significant 
changes in this area, and parties to settlements are cautioned to be familiar with the applicable 
law in their state to ensure that, to the extent possible, all necessary protections are taken to 
ensure that all future rights are reserved against any nonsettling parties. 
59. See the settlements discussed supra text and note at note 50. 
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proach: the first phase of the study is highly specific in its commit-
ments, allowing Stauffer the opportunity to project accurately its 
costs for this phase of the investigation. Phase II of the study entails 
a more open-ended commitment which provides for additional study 
as needed pursuant to stated criteria. This second phase provides the 
flexibility needed to ensure that the site will be adequately studied. 
Following the full investigative study, Stauffer will propose a recom-
mended remedial action which EPA and the state may accept or re-
ject. A period of time for negotiation is provided. If the remedial ac-
tion plan is accepted, Stauffer is obligated to participate as directed 
and in accordance with its determined proportionate share of liabil-
ity. If the proposal is rejected, Stauffer has no further obligations 
under the agreement; on the other hand, neither is Stauffer released 
from liability. Thus, both parties have a strong interest in seeing that 
an acceptable remedial action is implemented: EPA wants the site 
cleaned up; Stauffer wants its release from liability. 
4. Citizen Participation 
The presence of a hazardous waste site can cause significant fear 
and concern in the local community. particularly alarming for the af-
fected citizens are the unknown health impacts such a site may 
have.60 It is, therefore, important to provide as much knowledge as 
possible to the local community, to keep the citizenry thoroughly in-
formed regarding the activities occurring at the site, and to ensure 
that the citizens understand those legal constraints and limitations 
which affect how the government responds in a particular situation. 
The National Contingency Plan recognizes the affected locality by 
stating that response personnel should be "sensitive to local com-
munity concerns in accordance with applicable guidance." 61 This 
guidance includes the establishment of an effective community rela-
tions program at each site. The goal of this program is to set forth 
the various ways in which the agency in charge of the response plans 
will communicate with the citizens through public forums, press re-
leases, and meetings. 
When the negotiations with Stauffer began in Woburn, a local Citi-
zens Advisory Committee (CAC) was already in existence and was 
meeting twice a month to participate in and track developments con-
cerning the hazardous waste site. Federal and State regulatory offi-
60. s. Seltzer, ilamrdouB Waste Injury Litigation: A Proposalfrr TfYrl Reform, 10 B.C. 
ENVT'L AFr. L. REv. _ (1982). 
61. 47 Fed. Reg. 31,214 (July 16, 1982). 
1982-83] SUPERFUND SETTLEMENT AGREEMENTS 713 
cials attended most meetings of the CAC. Duripg the lengthy period 
of time the group had been meeting, the members developed a com-
prehensive understanding of all issues surrounding the site.62 
Throughout the course of the negotiations with Stauffer, the regu-
latory agencies made a substantial effort to keep the CAC informed 
and to seek their input. Stauffer was very cooperative in this en-
deavor. For example, prior to presenting an investigative study pro-
posal, representatives of Stauffer attended a meeting of the CAC to 
hear the specific concerns of the citizens. They also attended other 
meetings of the CAC to present their study proposal and to accept 
comments. Because of this regular communication and the willing-
ness of all parties to listen to each other, the original fears and suspi-
cions of the citizens were largely overcome. In this way, the negotia-
tions took into account the concerns of those most affected by haz-
ardous waste problems. 
5. Federal-State Relations 
Although few states have a statute with the breadth of authority of 
CERCLA, most states have their own panoply of environmental 
laws which are often similar to their federal counterparts. There-
fore, in addition to its federal liability, a responsible party may face 
the risk of being the recipient of a state enforcement action pursuant 
to state law. For this reason, it is in the best interests of the respons-
ible party to attempt to resolve its liability with both EPA and the 
state in which the hazardous waste site is located. EPA encourages 
the involvement of the state in the negotiation of these agreements. 
The Woburn negotiations were marked by a close working rela-
tionship between EPA and the Massachusetts DEQE. The result 
was the issuance of one document to which EPA, the state, and 
Stauffer were parties. This resulted in the most efficient use of the 
agencies' resources. In addition, the embodiment of the agreement 
in a single document offers greater assurance that consistency and 
uniformity in the implementation of the consent order will result. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Resolving problems at Superfund sites through negotiated agree-
ments is a difficult and complex undertaking. Nevertheless, there 
62. EPA recently reached a settlement with Velsicol Chemical Corp., requiring it to clean 
up releases of PBB from its plant in St. Louis, Michigan. The Environmental Defense Fund un-
successfully requested that environmental and citizen groups be involved in negotiations. The 
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are significant benefits for both the responsible parties and the EPA 
in the settlement of these cases. Upon entering negotiations, the par-
ties should be willing to consider all aspects of the issues in contro-
versy and to develop fair and reasonable solutions that accommodate 
each other's concerns without sacrificing the technical needs of the 
site. In addition, the concerns of the local community must be ad-
dressed in a meaningful way. Finally, as with any complex negotia-
tion, the wording of the agreement should be clear and concise to 
prevent any subsequent misinterpretation of its terms. Approached 
from this perspective, significant headway will be made in the 
cleanup of the nation's many hazardous waste sites. 
issue of citizen involvement in actual negotiations underscores the tension between policies 
which foster public input and the need for frank exchange and confidentiality in negotiations. 
See Radin, Deep Well Was Key in PBB Contamination Settlement, The Boston Globe, Jan. 13, 
1983, at 7, col. 2. 
